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FOREWORD
The words, from the 1970s ballad, "Me and Bobby
McGee," "Freedom's just another word for nothin' left
to lose..." might apply to the terrible state of the
Russian economy and, by extension, Russia's armed
forces. Since the Soviet Union crumbled in 1991 and the
Russian government set the country on its shaky journey
toward capitalism and democracy, the Russian economy
has been in a downward spiral; one which has drawn a
majority of Russians into poverty and even lowered the
average life expectancy by some 10 percent. To provide
some scale for comprehending the magnitude of this
problem, the more than 1.5 million men and women in
uniform in the Russian armed forces and the 600,000
civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense, as well
as the several million military pensioners throughout
the land, must share a total defense budget of $15-$18
billion per year. That is about one-fourth of the U.S.
Army's budget.
The paper that follows, by retired Soviet Army
Colonel Vitaly Shlykov, is a brutally honest appraisal
of the harsh realities that are a part of today's
Russia. It was presented at the Army War College's
Eighth Annual Strategy Conference, "Russia's Future as
a World Power," held at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, April 22-24, 1997. Colonel Shlykov's
paper is even more sobering when one considers that the
October Revolution of 1917 began in the bread lines of
Petrograd and Moscow.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies
Institute
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THE CRISIS IN THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY
It seems as if the universal laws of economics do
not apply to Russia. According to the economic theory,
in the period of transition from a rigidly centralized
economy to free market, prices are not set, state-owned
businesses are privatized, and then there is a phase--2
or 3 years long--of painful adjustment and rising
unemployment. After that--and this has been happening
in Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic
states--the economy starts growing.
Russia freed prices on January 2, 1992. It
privatized tens of thousands of enterprises, stabilized
the ruble, and wrung inflation out of its economy. In
1996 the government squeezed inflation to a manageable
21.8 percent, the lowest since the start of reforms and
down sharply from 133 percent in 1995. The monthly
inflation rate fell steadily through 1996, sinking to
1.4 percent in December from 4.1 percent in January.
Now it has been more than 5 years since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, but statistics show a continuous,
Great Depression-scale contraction (approximately 50
percent since 1991). In 1996 gross domestic product
(GDP) was 6 percent lower than a year earlier.
Industrial output has fallen 5 percent for the year,
worse than the 3 percent decline in 1995.
Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister, Viktor
Ilyushin, has released statistics indicating that,
contrary to much of what the government has been
saying, each consequent year of reforms continues to
pull people into poverty. Characterizing the situation
in Russia's social sector as "catastrophic," Ilyushin
said that real incomes are now 40 percent lower than
they were just 5 years ago. In January 1997 the
subsistence level was 394,000 rubles per person ($70) a
month, with 22.4 percent of Russians (about 33 million)
earning below that level. A full 75 percent of that
total--R290,000--just covers the monthly food basket of
25 dietary essentials such as eggs, bread, flour, and
milk. The balance covers costs associated with housing,
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transport, medicines, and clothing. Average per capita
incomes were 111 percent above the subsistence level
(R829,600, or $150). The country's top 10 percent of
wage earners had 12.8 times more income than the bottom
10 percent. Only 7.3 million, or 4.9 percent of the
population, earned more than 2 million rubles per
month.
The State Statistics Committee also reported wage
arrears totaling 48.6 trillion rubles as of January 27,
1997, a 3 percent rise on the previous 5 weeks. Budget
shortfalls accounted for 19.5 percent of arrears, while
money shortages at companies and other organizations
made up the remaining 80 percent. Russian industry
workers are owed 22.93 trillion rubles in back wages,
with 1.044 trillion rubles of that owed by federal and
local budgets, and 21.886 trillion rubles owed by
companies themselves. Life expectancy has plunged to
its lowest in 15 years. According to the World Health
Organization in Geneva, the average Russian man can
expect to live 57.4 years, compared to 61.1 years in
1981 and nearly 64 years before Mikhail Gorbachev
stepped down and President Boris Yeltsin started
Russia's transition to capitalism.
Russia's disastrous economic situation seems on
the surface like a social explosion waiting to happen.
And indeed, in two of the largest walkouts since the
Soviet collapse, coal miners and the Far East energy
workers staged huge strikes last year that ended only
when the government came up with hundreds of billions
of rubles in back wages. And yet despite a steep drop
in living standards and a dramatic worsening of the
problem of unpaid wages, the rumble of protest has yet
to turn into a unified roar--the kind that could stir
mass action and perhaps force changes in economic
policy.
Many experts, both Russian and Western, express
puzzlement over how a significant segment of the work
force can go without pay for up to 6 months. Among the
possible reasons, they say, are union disarray, fear of
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unemployment, a national psyche not fully geared to
striking, and, finally, the renowned stoicism of the
Russians. Yet, in the land of the original Potemkin
village, rarely is anything as it seems.
In Russia, where most firms play down success for
fear of paying taxes, poor output figures often hide a
booming black market economy. Official figures,
reassessed after the World Bank complaints that Russian
statisticians were ignoring the black market economy,
indicate that it accounts for 22 percent of GDP. But
even Prime Minister Chernomyrdin admits that the size
of the untaxed shadow economy might be as high as 50
percent of GDP. The Russian Ministry of Economics even
refuses to believe the data of the State Statistical
Committee about decline of the Russian economy in 1996
and insists that there was no fall in GDP or industrial
production last year. As proof, it cites the official
statistical data, according to which the electricity
output, which cannot be easily hidden, actually grew in
1996.
The fact that from one-quarter to one-half of
Russia's GDP is hidden from the authorities probably
explains why there is no widespread hunger, even though
large swathes of the population have not received
salaries for months. There is also a big difference
between average salary and average income level of a
Russian citizen. Every business either keeps two books
or has other ways of compensating its workers because
of the obvious impossibility of providing for a family
on an average salary or even on two average salaries.
The shadow economy means that the economic pie is
larger than the official statistics would suggest.
Signs of conspicuous consumption of wealth can be
seen in all the large Russian cities. New modern
buildings are being constructed, old buildings are
being lavishly restored, and the so-called "New
Russians," that is, people with large fortunes, race
around in their BMWs and designer clothes. The majority
of these individuals, with their pompous mansions and
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expensive cars, successfully avoid paying taxes. On the
other hand, the new "money elite" throws its money
around. No one is rushing forward to announce himself
the owner of a large fortune by giving the government,
society, and the media real figures on the sources of
that wealth. And this is probably not just because of
the criminal or semi-criminal origin of much wealth,
but because, for now, such are the "rules of the game"
established by the government.
The separation of the "New Russians" into a
special social class is connected not so much with
their role in the organization of modern industry and
in the effective management of the national economy as
it is with the process of acquiring and distributing
wealth, with the status and prestige of consuming.
Market and banking activities, profitable import-export
operations, the use of privatized property by either
selling or renting, the apportioning to themselves of
huge deposits and "dividends"--these are the main
sources of the quick separation of Russian society into
the "money elite" and the "average Joes." All of this
only leads to the growth of alienation between the
disparate social groups. It creates the danger that
Russian society will be polarized and unstable, with
great potential for unrest and conflict.
There are signs that Russians' resources for
getting by have been largely exhausted. The
government's strict monetary policy, intended to tame
inflation, has been squeezing state coffers and causing
unpaid wages and pensions to skyrocket. Overdue wages
and social benefits have more than tripled in a year to
about 40 trillion rubles ($7 billion). Workers
sometimes get their pay in shoddy or basic goods.
Enterprises across Russia offer employees candy,
cement, coats, vodka, and even cigarette lighters and
brassieres imported from China.
The picture of the Russian economy painted even by
the top-level officials in the Russian government is
striking both for its blackness and its candor. Deputy
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Prime Minister Ilyushin said that Moscow might adopt
inflationary policies that "might not please certain
international monetary organizations." At the end of
1996, Economics Minister Yevgueny Yasin wrote in a
letter to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin that "if
existing trends in the economy are continued without
energetic and purposeful efforts to break them and
create real conditions for economic growth, the
situation will in all probability continue to get
worse." He said that the 1997 budget was completely
unrealistic and that revenue forecasts should be scaled
down, and both social and defense spending had to be
cut, even if this increased the risk of political
unrest. But Yasin's warnings were not heeded. The
government pushed through the State Duma a budget for
1997 that no one believes to be even slightly
realistic. Consider these basic numbers: The 1997
budget pledges to raise spending to 19.4 percent of
GDP, whereas last year's spending ran at only 15.4
percent of GDP. The budget allows that 3.5 percent of
the whole will be filled by borrowing, but the rest
must come from taxes. In other words, Russia must
collect taxes worth 15.9 percent of its GDP.
Everyone admits that this is impossible. Last
year, according to the State Statistics Committee,
Russia could only raise revenue equal to 11.1 percent
of the GDP from taxes. In fact, the budget offers few
clues on how revenues are to be boosted by a hefty 4.5
percent of GDP. The point is that no one, not even
those closest to the process, believes that the
budget's rosy predictions of a huge boost in spending
financed by massive growth in government revenues are
real. "Only 70 to 80 percent of the things in the
budget will ever happen," said Mikhail Zadornov, head
of the Duma's budget committee. Sergei Dubinin,
chairman of the Central Bank, said the figures are so
wrong that the government will have to cut spending by
60 to 130 trillion rubles this year to compensate.
Well then, what lies behind this elaborate smoke
and mirror game if the numbers are all nonsense? The
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confusion is a sign that a budget in Russia is
something very different in purpose from its Western
counterparts. In other countries, the budget is a real
plan for the national household for the next 12 months.
In Russia, the budget has emerged as something like a
statement of good intentions. For the government, the
real purpose of the budget is not so much to win
detailed approval of its spending plan but to win a
mandate to continue fighting inflation and containing
the budget deficit. A formal budget bill is necessary
for the government to secure International Monetary
Fund support for the continuation of its 3-year $10.1
billion loan agreement.
The good news for the government is that it has
more or less won. The new budget incorporates its low
inflation target of 11.8 percent for 1997, backed by a
relatively low deficit projection of only 3.5 percent
of GDP. From the government's point of view, everything
else in the budget will take second place to meeting
its monetary targets. So in order to hold the line on
the deficit and inflation, spending will have to be
slashed.
That is what happened last year. The government
promised to spend a lavish 18.9 percent of GDP, funded
by 15.1 percent in revenue. In fact, revenue collapsed
to 11.1 percent, but the government slashed spending to
only 14.4 percent. All the numbers in the budget were
skewed except for one: the government still met its
target of keeping the budget deficit around 3 to 4
percent. Having accepted that the budget is about
setting low inflation and budget deficit targets and
that spending predictions are just serendipity, the
rest of the budget process becomes understandable,
albeit rather comic.
Only about one-third of the budget, including
spending on education, wages, food, and medicine for
the army, and interest on government debt, has been
listed as so-called protected items that will receive
priority financing. According to the law, if the
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quarterly revenue collection falls below 90 percent of
the projected amount, the government is supposed to
present parliament with a bill that outlines
proportional cuts on all spending items apart from the
protected items. This will probably wipe out investment
spending as well as other crucial items such as
subsidies to the pension fund and local governments.
Russia's fairy tale budgets have been allowing
politicians to avoid responsibility so far for the nonpayments crisis in the country because, in Russia,
parallel to the official state budget there exists the
so-called quasi-budget sector that includes the huge
pension fund, the road fund, and the local budgets.
When this wider definition is taken into account,
Russia's government spending rises from 14 to 38
percent of GDP. When, in January 1997, about one-tenth
of Russia's 4.5 million teachers went on strike to
protest overdue wages (some teachers have not been paid
for 8 months), the government simply blamed local
officials for the problem. The difficulties the local
governments face in financing their needs are enormous.
Two-thirds of the housing costs in Russia are still
assumed by the state. Russians spend only a small
percentage of their family income on electricity,
heating, and building maintenance. If all the budget
expenditures on housing are added together, one arrives
at the astronomical figure of 103 trillion rubles
($18.2 billion). This is exactly the size of the
Russian defense budget for 1997. For education and
health, the local governments also spend approximately
100 trillion rubles a year.
Simple estimates show that if housing, education,
and health reforms are not carried out any time soon,
building maintenance and other subsidies will simply
eat up the Russian economy. There are signs that the
government seems to understand this. Speaking at the
World Economic Forum in Davos at the end of January
1997, Economics Minister Yevgueny Yasin stated that
Russia was faced with disaster unless it cut spending
by about a third in the next 3 years. "If we fail, we
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will be faced with the prospect of an extended
depression. Russia has probably more social dependents
than any other country, with the possible exception of
Sweden. We want to build a capitalist market economy
with a socialist system of social security," he said.
The problem is that strong political will is needed to
carry out such reforms. Only a president who will not
be running for the next election can carry out the
needed reforms. Whether President Boris Yeltsin will
decide to do so, however, is another matter.
Yeltsin and the government seem to be preoccupied
with more immediate problems. The fact that government
revenues remain catastrophically low (60 percent of
that planned in 1996) has apparently forced the
government to declare war on tax evaders. Russians have
had a field day with the president's decision to form
in October 1996 a "Temporary Extraordinary Commission"-called Vcheka (nicknamed from a contraction of three
Cyrillic letters in its unwieldy full title)--using
their wits to keep fighting the war on taxes. The
commission has the same initials as a secret police
organization that Lenin established in 1917 to spread
state terror. The name stuck and, even as the Vcheka
(or Cheka for short) mutated over the years into the
KGB, Soviet citizens continued to refer to it in
fearful whispers as the Cheka. The choice of this name
was no accident. Tax evasion is a national sport in
Russia, and any worker can cite examples of how his
enterprise or organization has managed to evade taxes.
So the naming of the tax commission Vcheka was a
flamboyant propaganda play to show that the government
was serious about collecting taxes.
But it will probably be just a case of much heat
with little light. So far, the Vcheka's major move has
been to fire a middle-rank customs official and to
start bankruptcy proceedings against four companies
which owe only a small fraction of the overall
corporate tax arrears. No move has yet been made
against the really serious tax evaders that enjoy
political favor--like Gazprom, the gas conglomerate
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once run by Chernomyrdin. Such cronyism causes most
Russians to dismiss the new tax war as nothing but
power-mongering inside the Kremlin. To many observers,
the Vcheka is an instrument of Yeltsin's chief of staff
Anatoly Chubais--crafted not merely to tame the
financial bedlam, but to strengthen his own power.
While any of the above-mentioned measures would be
a step in the right direction, the single most useful
action the government could take to increase the
catastrophically low state revenues would be a genuine
overhaul of Russia's tax system. The existing tax
system--if it can be called a system--is made up of
1,200 poorly coordinated or utterly contradictory
presidential decrees, government orders, and
ministerial instructions. Moreover, there are about
another 3,000 legislative and sub-legislative acts that
indirectly refer to tax norms. Thus, the more than
4,000 such acts regulate about 20 various taxes. Even
the representatives of the tax service are not always
able to figure them all out. As for taxpayers, almost
anyone can be accused of violating one of the 4,000 tax
documents. The debt of taxpayers to the budget is
steadily growing. Last year, the sum of taxes that was
owed was more than twice the 1995 level. Companies and
individuals are not the only tax debtors. Of the 89
subjects of the Russian Federation, only three have
fully paid their debt to the federal budget.
Furthermore, seven out of the 89 regions provide almost
52 percent of the budget's revenues, with Moscow
accounting for 27 percent.
On February 20, 1997, the government considered
for the first time the draft of a new tax code, which
the Finance Ministry has been working on for years. The
idea behind the tax code is to put order into this
contradictory and often inscrutable tax system in
Russia, limit arbitrary rule by officials, and decrease
the opportunities for legally and illegally evading
taxes. The tax code proposes to simplify the existing
system. It would reduce the number of taxes from 200 to
30. The code also is aimed at making fundamental
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changes in tax exemptions. While working on the new tax
code, the Finance Ministry uncovered an astronomical
number of tax exemptions acquired at various times by
various means. The level of lost budget revenues
because of these exemptions is estimated by the Finance
Ministry at 160-170 trillion rubles a year.
The task of taking away exemptions is a formidable
one. Any government which really intends to halt this
gravy train will face fierce resistance from an army of
special interests and their parliamentary sponsors (for
instance, removing the tax privileges from the
thousands of generals and hundreds of thousands of
officers in the Russian army, who are exempt from
paying income tax). The tax police, who are there to
catch tax evaders, are exempt from income tax. Even in
the government itself, the Finance Ministry has hardly
any allies with its new tax code. Many ministers openly
and secretly fight to keep their existing privileges-and not without some success. The tax code, which the
government looked at when it convened on February 20,
was not sent to the State Duma, as the Finance Ministry
had hoped, but was sent back to be reworked. The
chances of the new tax code being passed by the present
Duma are extremely slim. Compared with what the holders
of tax privileges stand to lose, dismissing the finance
minister or the government itself, which are trying to
abolish these exemptions, would be a very small price
to pay.
But what really makes the attempts of the present
government to improve the economic situation futile is
the beginning disintegration of the Russian military
machine. In only a few years the military force that
held most of the world in terror has been plunged into
penury and humiliation, for the most part by its own
government. The government seems totally incapable of
solving the financial problems of the military.
The errors that were permitted during the
development of Russian military budgets were so
elementary for any competent economist that it is
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awkward to talk about them. First, the rapid coming
together of the purchasing power of the ruble and the
dollar was not taken into account. Second, the radical
change of the structure of the military budget itself
was ignored. In economic practice, the so-called
currency purchasing power parity is used to conduct
international financial-economic comparisons. This is
done because the national currency exchange rate system
(both floating and also fixed) does not provide
satisfactory accuracy of comparisons of cost parameters
because the currency exchange rate system serves only
the sphere of foreign economic activity and not the
economy as a whole. Moreover, currency exchange rates
can fluctuate over the course of a year, a month, or a
day for various political and temporary reasons. Simply
speaking, purchasing power parity indicates the number
of country A's monetary units needed to purchase a
certain standard selection of goods and services which
one can purchase for one of country B's monetary units.
In dollars based upon the market exchange rate,
Ministry of Defense military expenditures are shown in
Figure 1 (in billions of dollars). It is obvious from
the figures cited that military expenditures in dollars
are ridiculously small if compared to the military
expenditures of the leading Western countries. However,
the military expenditures of the USSR, or later of
Russia, expressed in dollars always seemed to be a
curious thing. In 1989 the Soviet military budget was
approved in the amount of 20.2 billion rubles.
According to the official currency exchange rate ($0.70
to R1), this totaled less than $15 billion per year.
And at that level of military expenditures, the USSR
contrived to maintain military parity with the United
States, which spent $300 billion per year on defense.

Years

Billions of
Dollars

1993
1994
1995

7.4
18.0
12.8

Dollar Exchange Rate
(Rubles per Dollar)
932
2,204
4,554
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1996

15.1

5,200

Figure 1. Ministry of Defense
Military Expenditures.
The conviction that the military ruble is quite a
bit "heavier" than the civilian ruble has become
ingrained in all the individuals involved in the
military budget based upon past experience. Actually,
at the end of 1980s, the USSR Academy of Sciences
conducted very complex calculations which have
convincingly shown that the defense ruble in the
production of military equipment was at a minimum 3-4
times weightier than the civilian ruble. So nobody
expressed any surprise that the Russian Armed Forces,
with a strength of more than two million, could be
maintained, for example, in 1993 on a budget that was
equivalent to $7.4 billion, according to the official
currency exchange rate.
But as market relations have advanced in the
Russian economy, the difference between the civilian
and military ruble has gradually disappeared. So, if
the ruble's commercial exchange rate in dollars totaled
10 percent of purchasing power parity at the beginning
of 1992, then it reached 65 percent of purchasing power
parity by the end of 1995 and has been slowly
approaching the official exchange rate since then.
According to data of the RF State Committee on
Statistics, the ruble exchange rate based upon
purchasing power parity totaled R271 in 1993, R988 in
1994, R2,759 in 1995, and approximately R4,300 per
dollar in 1996. If converted into dollars based upon
purchasing power parity, the Ministry of Defense
expenditures totaled $28.7 billion in 1993, $40.2
billion in 1994, $21.1 billion in 1995, and $18.2
billion in 1996. From this data, it follows that in
1993 the Armed Forces actually received not $7.4
billion, as it turns out during the conversion of the
military budget into dollars based upon the currency
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exchange rate, but four times as much ($28.7 billion).
Consequently, in 1994 the Ministry of Defense increased
its budget by another $11.5 billion, to the quite
impressive sum of $40.2 billion.
The year 1995 became crucial when military
expenditures were immediately reduced by a factor of
two (from $40.2 billion to $21.2 billion). And that
wholesale reduction occurred under conditions of the
fierce war in Chechnya, for the conduct of which not a
single ruble was allocated according to the 1995 budget
(as, by the way, in the 1996 budget). According to
Ministry of Defense data, R5.71 trillion (that is,
approximately 10 percent of the entire military budget
for last year) was spent on the maintenance of the Army
Formation in Chechnya alone in 1995. Military budget
reductions of that scale occur in world practice only
after the end of large wars when the army is being
demobilized. However, even in that case, reductions
occur more or less gradually because the reintegration
of a large number of servicemen into peaceful life is
not cheap in democratic states. The situation was
totally different in Russia in 1995. It had not
completed any war; on the contrary, Russia had
precisely unleashed a war, although a local one. There
was also no reduction of the armed forces. The
reduction of the military budget by a factor of two
took place unexpectedly without any preliminary warning
whatsoever of the military leadership, thus the latter
did not have an opportunity somehow to adjust to it. A
further reduction of expenditures for the army, and a
quite substantial one (from $21.1 to $18.2 billion-that is, by 13.5 percent) has been set forth in the
1996 budget.
Ignoring the structure of the military budget
itself was the authorities' second error. At the end of
the 1980s-beginning of the 1990s, if three-fourths of
the military budget went for the purchase of arms and
military R&D and only one-fourth for maintenance of
personnel, this ratio has become the exact opposite in
the last 4 years. Right now, one-fourth of the budget
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goes for purchases and R&D. The remaining
appropriations are designated for the monetary
allowances of servicemen and salaries of employees,
payment of food and clothing, housekeeping and
utilities, infrastructure support of the troops,
medical service, payment of fuel, military transport
movements, and payment of pensions and construction
(mainly housing). As is seen from this list,
practically all military expenditures, except arms
purchases and R&D where market relations have still not
penetrated, are being carried out based upon consumer
prices. And this means that the compilers of the
military budget were simply obliged to set forth in it
the actual level of inflation during its development
and not that artificially lowered index-deflator, while
predicting military expenditures which lag behind the
actual rates of inflation by a factor of 3 to 4.
However, this is not even the main thing. Changing
the structure of the military budget has
disproportionately increased the impact on the Armed
Forces of the military expenditure reductions that were
being conducted. In 1992 Gaidar reduced military
purchases immediately by two-thirds which did not
arouse practically any resistance whatsoever from the
Armed Forces. The fact is that it struck not the Armed
Forces but the military-industrial complex which
usually forced its products on the Armed Forces,
without especially being interested in whether or not
the military needed them. Therefore the military has
always been less interested in the budget items for
weapons purchases and R&D (for which it in general did
not pay prior to 1991 and right now, it seems, does not
pay very much) than for the appropriations for the
maintenance of personnel and combat training.
Nevertheless, the presence in the budget of large
appropriations for the purchase and development of arms
substantially alleviated the Armed Forces' financial
situation, while permitting them to write off a portion
of the military budget reductions at their expense.
Now any reduction of the defense budget already
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hits the very foundations of the military's existence-food support, spares, medical service, and combat
training. In practice, all this means that more than
1.5 million Russian Armed Forces and 600,000 Ministry
of Defense civilian employees and all the military
pensioners must live on $15-18 billion per year. Common
sense rejects accepting the fact that one can maintain
a more than two million-man military armed force with
very complex modern weapons for this amount of money.
And, of course, in real life the Armed Forces have
weighty additions to their official budget. The Armed
Forces actually do not pay for utilities (electricity,
heat, water, etc.) and many of their orders, including
those for equipment, food, clothing and transportation.
This partly explains why the military has not mutinied
or simply dispersed at such a miserly level of official
defense expenditures.
But the situation cannot last forever. Defense
Minister Igor Rodionov says that the 1997 defense
budget covers only one-third of the military's
necessary expenses. The budget for 1997 envisions
spending R104 trillion, or $19 billion, on defense.
Added to these outlays are expenditures in the budget
on other military formations outside the Ministry of
Defense (border guard troops, interior troops,
different security forces, railroad troops, etc.) which
amount to more than R50 trillion. Given that all state
expenditures for this year come to about R500 trillion,
the share that will go toward defense and national
security accounts for one-third of the budget. It is
impossible to triple this share, as Rodionov demands,
without catastrophic consequences for Russia.
How did this situation arise in the first place? A
nearly total absence of competent military economists
and financiers whatsoever in both the government and
presidential structures and also in the State Duma and
Ministry of Defense has had an impact. Only a complete
loss of touch with reality can explain the fact that in
1995-96 the Russian leadership increased the strength
of the Armed Forces (by increasing the length of
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conscription from 18 to 24 months), drove the army into
an expensive war in Chechnya, kept an enormous defense
industry by using feeble military orders, doubled
expenditures for military R&D, purchased from the
Ukraine strategic bombers that are mindlessly expensive
in operation and at the same time<D> dramatically (by
more than half) reduced military expenditures.
But of course the present financial predicament of
the military would not be so disastrous if it were not
for the terrible economic crisis that has been
unfolding in Russia in the 1990s. There are many
reasons for the depth and duration of this crisis. But
there is one which largely goes unnoticed both in
Russia and the West--Russia's failure to demilitarize
its economy. In hearings before the Senate Intelligence
Committee of the U.S. Congress in October 1993, I was
quoted as having stated that "there has been no
demilitarization of the Russian economy" and that "this
is the historic crime of the democratic leadership of
Russia." This certainly sounds like a gross
exaggeration in view of some well-known facts.
According to the Defense Industries Ministry
(Minoboronprom), in January 1997 the production of both
civilian and defense goods by the enterprises belonging
to the Ministry was only 17.8 percent of the output in
January 1991. The total number of enterprises belonging
to the Minoboronprom has fallen from 1,800 to just 500
in the past few years. By the end of February 1997 the
Defense Industries Ministry had not received a single
defense order for the current year. And yet, with all
that, I would stick to my "extravagant" statements
quoted in the U.S. Senate.
But first, "militarization of the Russian economy"
here deals more with macroeconomics, and much less with
tanks, guns, missiles, or evil doings of the militaryindustrial complex. To make this point clearer, there
is a great difference in the relations of the defense
industry to the economy as a whole in Russia and in the
West. In a Western country, possessed of a strong
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defense industry--for example, the United States--the
defense-industrial base is part of a much larger and
often more efficient civilian economy. In Russia, which
inherited its defense industry from the former Soviet
Union, it was the very core and substance of the
national economy. The civilian part of it was merely an
adjunct to the defense sector and so inefficient that
in an open market economy, it simply could not survive.
The main reason for the low productivity of the
civilian sector is that for more than half a century
all the best technologies, material, and human
resources of the country were being channeled into
defense and related industries, while civilian
industries and the economic infrastructure were doomed
to partial or complete inefficiency. The backwardness
of the civilian industries is proportionate to the
funds diverted from them into the defense sector. This
kind of economy can exchange its products only on a
compulsory or noncommercial basis: through direct
distribution of resources at artificially fixed prices.
In other words, an economy like this can function only
if it defies the laws governing market systems. If such
an economy were to switch abruptly to prices
corresponding to world prices, the system of ties
between them would eventually and inevitably collapse.
And this is exactly what has happened in Russia over
the last 5 years.
The distortion of an economy which does not
respond to such measures as cutting defense
expenditures or defense purchases and does not allow
overflow of financial resources from the defense into
the civilian sector is structural militarization as
opposed to the usual militarization which can be
measured by the shares of defense spending and defense
production in national budgets, GNP, etc. All defense
procurement in a structurally militarized economy can
be stopped, and still this drastic measure will not
result in a corresponding increase in efficiency of the
civilian economy or other noticeable changes in the
economy for the better.
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Such an economy is completely unknown in the West,
where defense cuts sooner or later lead to a flow of
resources from the defense to the civilian sector.
People move to new jobs, new specialties, or new
locations. Factory buildings are sold, machinery is
auctioned to new owners in a very active market, and
land is sold to new owners. Defense conversion in the
West is thus a diffuse activity. Demand falls in one
sector and rises somewhere else. Nothing like this has
happened in Russia so far, despite huge cuts in defense
purchases--nor is it likely to happen in the
foreseeable future, even if defense cuts go on. The
failure to comprehend these fundamental differences
between the economic systems of Russia and the rest of
the industrial world explains the excessive optimism of
the Western public and politicians about the prospects
of market reform and demilitarization in Russia.
Unfortunately, the difficulties of dismantling a
structurally militarized economy have been ignored by
the Russian reformers themselves. As a result, they
have committed several grave mistakes, have wasted
precious time, and, sad to say, lost some irretrievable
opportunities to thoroughly dismantle Soviet-Russian
militarism. Their biggest mistake was a firm belief
that money can play a decisive role in changing the
ways of the Russian economy, and that it can be managed
with the help of a budgetary and credit policy. It is
certainly tempting to use financial indicators in
summing up the results of economic development and
formulating its goals, instead of getting bogged down
in the intricacies and problems of technological and
structural imbalances between the civilian and military
sectors of the economy. Moreover, this practice of
using financial indicators is accepted all over the
world and is intellectually and administratively not
very demanding, with ready-made and tested recipes
galore.
I realize that all my conclusions are not
inspiring. I have deliberately refrained from
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discussing more desirable or ideal ways out of Russia's
current predicament, knowing that the state of mind and
the prevailing forces in my country make such a
discussion rather unrealistic. Russia to a growing
extent displays many of the maladies of a vicious
circle of failed reforms. It is difficult to tell if
the Russian government really believes in any policy
besides its own survival. A series of flip-flops,
retreats, and promises over the last years suggest that
practically nothing the government says or does
concerning economic policy can be taken seriously.
Budget revenue is coming in at a rate of just 60
percent of the forecast; investors are not investing;
enterprises are bartering to avoid taxes; and, lobbies
are begging an already bankrupt government for money.
With the news coming from Russia, full of lurid tales
of backstabbing, intrigue, and corruption, it may seem
as if Russia is back to the age-old Byzantine
traditions of the Kremlin politics. And yet the last 5
years of reform were not without their positive sides
for the economy. Despite the fact that Russia continues
to be misgoverned, a genuine private sphere existing
outside the state has appeared for the first time in 80
years. The growth of civil society gives some hope that
Russians will one day expect their government to serve
them, not the other way around. Besides, virtually
everything that unfolded in Russia in the last years
did so in the full daylight of media scrutiny. And, by
and large, after October 1993 when President Yeltsin
dissolved the parliament, no official acted openly
unconstitutionally. It is not a real democracy, to be
sure, but certainly a vast improvement from just 5
years ago, even in the middle of a no-holds-barred
power struggle. Conventional wisdom notwithstanding,
the more Russia changes, the more it seems not to be
the same.
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